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THE TRUMPET PLAYER'S LAMENT:
RETHINKING THE CIVIL GIDEON MOVEMENT
Chad Flanders and Alexander Muntges*
INTRODUCTION

In Gideon 's Trumpet,' Anthony Lewis recounts the story of
Clarence Gideon, an indigent man whose appeal to the United States
Supreme Court improbably culminated with the Court holding that the
right to counsel in a criminal trial was a fundamental right, one which
requires the states to provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants. 2
Almost fifty years later in Turner v. Rogers,3 the Court rejected the
analogous argument that the right to counsel in a civil contempt
proceeding was a fundamental right where an indigent, noncustodial
parent faces incarceration. This argument was at the core of the civil
Gideon movement - one could hardly have imagined a better test case
- and accordingly, the Court's adverse holding was a major blow. But
many in that movement have held out hope, and not without good
reason.
Those who reject the idea that there should be a civil Gideon have
the burden of showing that there is a meaningful (functional or
doctrinal) difference between the experience of the indigent civil
defendant and the indigent criminal defendant. The ways of showing
this are recognizable and familiar: criminal trials have more serious
consequences (e.g., prison) where the consequences of a civil trial are
Chad Flanders is Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School
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1 See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1989).

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
3 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011).
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minor in comparison (e.g., money damages); criminal trials are more
complex where civil trials are more straightforward; criminal trials set
indigent defendants against the state where civil trials are initiated by
and are between private parties; civil trials unlike criminal trials are
commonly non-adversarial and sometimes cooperative and
collaborative. These major defenses purport to give some substance to
the criminal-civil divide.
A major contention (made in Part I) of this paper is that none of
these defenses work on a conceptual level, a point which some of the
more sophisticated opponents of civil Gideon concede. The line
between the criminal and the civil is at best blurry both as an abstract,
philosophical matter and even as a practical, functional one. Some
criminal proceedings are simple, relatively non-adversarial (pleabargaining, when it works smoothly and with willing and capable
defendants), and can have minor consequences. Some civil trials can
have serious consequences (loss of a house, deportation, even jail
time), be extremely complex, and pit the individual in an adversarial
relationship against the state. Arguably, Turner had all of these
things.4 It is quite hard in fact to point to anything that would put a
clear line between the civil and the criminal except the formal point
that crimes are categorized as crimes and civil matters are not, and it
seems that this is often all that the Court is left to rely on.
But where does that leave us? Here, we become more tentative in
our conclusions. In the recent anniversary celebrations of the original
Gideon, much has been made of its lack of success; indeed, it has been
a long-standing complaint that Gideon's original promise has been
betrayed.5 Defenders of civil Gideon would do well do learn from
Gideon's failure, and instead of doubling down on the right to counsel,
something more modest and limited might be advisable.
After all, we can draw one of two broad lessons from the
conceptual collapse of the criminal-civil divide. On the one hand, we
could extend Gideon protections to both civil and criminal proceedings
-- because the distinction is only an empty formalism, we should treat
See Brooke D. Coleman, Prison is Prison, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013).
5 See Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and
Resistance after Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150 (2013); Yale
Kamisar, Gideon v. Wainwright: A Quarter-Century Later, 10 PACE L. REV. 343
(1990) (noting that it is possible to see Gideon's promise as being "betrayed");
Lincoln Caplan, Op-Ed., The Right to Counsel: Badly Battered at 50, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 2013, SR10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/
ooinion/sundav/the-right-to-counsel-badly-battered-at-50.html? r-O.
4

29

them the same and extend the automatic right to counsel to both. On
the other hand, we could use a flexible ad hoc approach to appointing
counsel in both the criminal and civil realms -- because the distinction
is only an empty formalism, we should treat them the same and refuse
the automatic right to counsel in both. We reflect on what the world
would look like if we did the latter, that is, a world where Gideon
never happened and the rule of Betts6 was used for appointing counsel.
In short, what if we gave up both criminal and civil Gideon and
adopted a more flexible, case-by-case approach for both? Would such
a world be better than the one we have now?
I.

THE BLURRY LINE BETWEEN THE CRIMINAL AND THE CIVIL

Start with a broad, abstract proposition that a person who is poor
and cannot afford an attorney should be provided with one in a
criminal case, but not in a civil case. What could justify this
proposition? We can put the answers into two categories. The first
category we will call substantive, for this reason: it points to some
substantive differences between the kinds of things that go on in
criminal trials and the kinds of things that go in civil trials. The second
category we will call formal, because it tends to abstract away from
what actually happens in trials, civil and criminal, and looks at more
doctrinal, even philosophical considerations. Civil and criminal trials
could be, substantively, a lot alike, but we still might be able to make
some distinction in "form" between them.
As is already clear, we believe that there is not much to say in
favor of any important distinction between the criminal and the civil.
But, we want to approach this in two steps: first, we want to make any
supposed formal or substantive distinction between the criminal and
civil fuzzy; second, we want to show how any clear line drawn will in
the end be little more than an empty formalism.
A. Consequences

One major substantive difference between the civil and the
criminal is thought to be that the consequences of a loss at a criminal
trial are much more serious and more severe than the consequences of
any civil trial. We can rebut this in a fairly intuitive way, by simply
listing the consequences of civil trials, such as the loss of a house, the
6

Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942).
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loss of a child, deportation, and even prison, 7 that are as bad, if not
worse, than the consequences of many criminal trials. We think that
this is, in fact, sufficient to show that we cannot draw the line between
civil and criminal based on consequences alone. Indeed, as Turner
shows, we cannot even say that loss of liberty is something that
defines the harms of a criminal trial, but not the harms of a civil trial.
Civil trials, too, can lead to a loss of liberty.
But can we say anything more than this? Perhaps those who want
to defend the badness of criminal trials might point to the potentially
greater downside risk than there is in civil cases. You can go to jail not
just for a limited time, as Turner faced in his civil contempt case, but
for a very long time, even the rest of your natural life. So the criminal
side may not have all the bad things that can happen to one as the
result of a failed legal proceeding, but it certainly has the worst.
We might disagree with this, and push back on what exactly counts
as "the worst." It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a
common metric here: how bad is losing a child compared to several
years in prison? But such an exercise would miss the point. All we
need to show is that some of the very bad things are both civil and
criminal (e.g., loss of a house, jail time, deportation, loss of child
custody), and that some of the not too bad things can be either civil or
criminal (e.g., fines).
The defender of the divide might have one final thing to say, which
is this: there is certainly a stigma attached to violations of the criminal
law that is not present in violations of the civil law. We are not so sure
that bad outcomes in civil trials are without stigma: being a deadbeat
dad, a delinquent tenant, or an immigrant who can longer stay in the
country and being told so in a court of law, certainly strike us as being

7 See e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011); Lassiter v. Dep't of
Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981); see also Erin B. Corcoran, Bypassing Civil
Gideon: A Legislative ProposalA Legislative Proposalto Address the Rising Costs
and Unmet Legal Needs of Unrepresented Immigrants, 115 W. VIR. L. REV. 643
(2012) (thousands of immigrants appearing before immigration courts without
qualified representation); Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil
Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel is Most Needed, 37

FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37 (2010) (discussing civil cases in which counsel may be most

necessary).
8 See Oral Argument 15-17:22, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No.
10-10), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument
transcripts/10-10.pdf (question of Ginsburg, J.) ("Now, that deprivation, some people
think, is the worst possible, for a custodial parent to be told you're no longer a parent,
you no longer have a child.").
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stigmatizing. Moreover, being convicted of some crimes may not be
stigmatizing, depending on the crime or the community.
If there is anything to this idea of a more powerful stigma, we
suspect that it is in fact, more of a formal point than a substantive
point. 9 As a substantive matter, there can be powerful stigmas to
losing civil trials, and these can be as bad or worse as losing a criminal
trial.' 0 All we need to show, in fact, is that some of the time the stigma
is pretty bad in civil trials and that some of the time the stigma is pretty
light in criminal trials.
B. Complexity
If the consequences of civil and criminal trials do not fall into any
neat division of bad and not so bad, can we say something about the
complexity of those trials? Here again, it is hard to draw any clear
lines. Some criminal matters, including but not limited to those that
end in plea bargains, can be rather straightforward. Consider someone
who is willing and competent to plead guilty (and his guilt is obvious
and conceded): it is not too much of a stretch to say that he can be
guided by a judge to the resolution of his case, and that he may not
need the assistance of an attorney at all. Some civil matters, such as
suits about housing, or divorce cases, or child custody battles, can be
confusing, protracted, and intricate. They can involve witnesses,
difficult evidential questions, layers of appeals, and overall rather
sophisticated legal maneuvering (and sometimes it takes a lawyer to
see how sophisticated a seemingly simple case can really be)
Again, as with questions of consequences, it seems foolish to try to
find some common and agreed upon measure of "complexity" in civil
and criminal trials. What is more complex: cross-examining a witness,
or arguing against a motion for summary judgment? It depends on the
witness and it depends on the motion. Some criminal trials will be
much more complicated than some civil trials, and vice versa. In the
majority opinion in Argersinger,Justice Douglas wrote:
The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a
fair trial even in a petty offense prosecution. We are by
no means convinced that legal and constitutional
9 We return to the question of formalism infra II.D.
10 Consider, again the stigma attached to being a deadbeat dad, or (worse)
having one's parental rights terminated. In many of these cases, as well, it is the state
conveying the negative message, not merely a private party.
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questions involved in a case that actually leads to
imprisonment even for a brief period are any less
complex than when a person can be sent off for six
months or more. 1

But the logic of Argersinger can and should be extended beyond cases
that involve prison into (complex) cases that put other significant
interests besides liberty interests at stake. The bright line drawn
between civil and criminal consequences is as arbitrary and artificial as
the one drawn between a briefperiod and six months which Douglas
criticized.
C. Adversariness and State Action

A further and familiar distinction between the civil and the
criminal contexts are that criminal trials are (always? inherently?)
adversarial and some civil proceedings are not. In Turner, for
instance, Justice Thomas suggests (in dissent) that the point of the trial
is not to pit Turner versus Rogers, but to help out the child, whom the
proceedings are ultimately for. 12 But even if Thomas is right (we
return to this, below), there are many other civil trials that are
adversarial and even some criminal trials which are not. Some criminal
trials, in which the defendant is willing to plea bargain and the state is
willing to give a generous offer (either because of the nature of the
evidence, the history of the defendant, or the defendant's willingness
to cooperate), the process could be described as almost cooperative.
Indeed, when the bargaining includes an option, say, to go into drug
treatment, the process can be described as having as one of its goals
benefitting the offender.
But the response to this may be that the important distinction is not
whether or not the parties are adversarial and not cooperating (as in
mediation or perhaps also arbitration). Rather, the key meaning is that
the state is on one side of the contest.' 3 That is, on one side are all the
resources and prestige and experience of the state, and on the other
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
112 Argersinger
Turner,

25, 33 (1972) (emphasis added).
131 S. Ct. at 2525 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
13 Kamisar, supra note 5 at 358-59 ("Now, how would I distinguish 'private
custody fights' from parental termination proceedings? ... [T]he argument for
appointed counsel in parental termination proceedings strikes me as a good deal
more compelling. In such proceedings, the government -- with its enormous

investigative and prosecutorial resources - is setting machinery in motion to abrogate
the parent-child relationship.").
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side is simply the lone, indigent opposing party. In this respect, then,
the main reason for having an attorney provided in a criminal trial is
because the trial pits the individual against the state.
Of course, if this is the key meaning, then sometimes it will be the
state against a person in the context of a civil suit: not all civil suits
follow the model of PrivateParty v. PrivateParty. The state may want

to take away someone's child, or to force them to make child support
payments, or to evict them from public housing, or to deport them.14
Even when the state is not the main party in a civil suit, it may still
have an interest, or be working behind the scenes in favor of one
party's interests, as was the case with Turner, where the proceeding
was for the benefit of the mother and her child."
We might put the problem this way: in the Turner case, is it Turner
against the mother of the child demanding child support, or is the state
threatening prison time if he doesn't pay the child support? The
answer is both. There is state action there, even if the caption of the
case is Turner v. Rogers.16 However much we would like child
custody proceedings to be non-adversarial (in both the sense that they
are friendly and that the matter is mostly between the parties and does
not involve the state) in reality, they are in fact very adversarial. If we
draw the line at state action, we have to acknowledge the
pervasiveness of the state's role in both criminal and civil suits.
This point also extends to another way in which we might draw the
divide between civil and criminal along the lines of "adversariness":
that the criminal defendant is the one hauled into court by the state,
where the civil plaintiff is there because he or she wants to be.

Sometimes this is the case but as Turner shows, it is not always the
case; nor is it the case with post-conviction review, or with deportation
proceedings, or the termination of parental rights. In each of these civil
cases, the person has been hauled into court against his or her will by
the state. If we wanted to restrict representation to these cases, we
would at most limit the right, not eliminate it. Certainly we would not
get a clean distinction between the criminal and the civil.
D. Formalism

14 Id.

In Turner v. Rogers, Turner was held in contempt for failing to make child
support payments, and was sentenced to 12 months in prison. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at
2519.
16 Id. at 2517.
15
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There is a temptation to a sort of formalism in looking at the
division between the criminal and the civil. We want to find some one
abstract thing that neatly cuts cases into those that can be called
criminal and those that can be called civil. But on each of the above
metrics, the formal category cannot do the substantive work that is
being asked of it. Bad consequences, including prison and fines, can
result from civil cases. Even beyond this, there are things that are
arguably worse than prison (losing one's parental rights), which can be
the consequence of an adverse civil judgment. So we cannot even rest
content in the formalism that the sanctions of the criminal justice
system go on one side of the divide as "the most bad" and all other
results of litigation go on the other side. The sanctions lie on both side
of the divide, and the divide does not always track what the worst
consequences are. Nor can we say with any confidence that civil trials
are as a general matter less complex or less adversarial than criminal
trials.
There is a similar temptation in other areas of law, of course. One
related example might be helpful by means of comparison here. In
defining punishment, the court has resorted to a sort of formal test to
see whether or not a sanction should be called a "criminal punishment"
(and so to decide whether ex post facto rules should apply).1 7 Those
factors involve considerations such as whether the sanction has a
history of being used as criminal punishment, advances the traditional
aims of punishment, or involves an affirmative disability or restraint.
In a recent case, the court held that registering for a sex offender
registry did not count as a "punishment" because it didn't meet the
multi-factored test for being a punishment. But it seems that formalism
ruled here, too: the registry was a restraint, advanced the traditional
goals of punishment, etc., as Justice Ginsburg forcefully answered in
dissent.' 8 It may not have been historically used as a punishment, but
this is because the idea of a registry is fairly new. To give that kind of
weight to history is, essentially, to leave the hard questions
unanswered.1 9 We think that the formalism of the division between the
17
1

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003).
Id. at 115-116 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).

19 See also Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/CriminalDistinction: A New Approach to the Regulation ofIndirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025,

1045-046 (1993) ("[T]he Court developed the criminal-civil contempt distinction
largely out of whole cloth-it was not a significant classification at common law, and
the Constitution makes no mention of contempt at all-in an effort to place procedural
constraints on the hitherto unbridled power of individual judges to impose
punishments for perceived insults or disobedience").
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criminal and civil also leaves the hard questions unanswered, in much
the same way. It creates the illusion that categories help us make a
decision about certain rights, when in fact the categories obscure the
issues at hand.
The Turner case represents the apotheosis of this sort of
formalism. The trouble for the Turner court in ruling the way it did
was to avoid the apparent holding of Lassiter which summarized the
post-Gideon line of cases as saying that, "The pre-eminent
generalization that emerges from this Court's precedents on an
indigent's right to appointed counsel is that such a right has been
recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical
liberty if he loses the litigation."20 No distinction is made between
cases where a person loses his liberty as a consequence of a civil
proceeding rather than a criminal proceeding. Nonetheless, the Turner
court refused to extend the "generalization" from the criminal to the
civil, instead characterizing the statement in Lassiter as not requiring
that counsel be appointed. 2 1 This is high formalism at its best:
overlooking substantive similarities - indeed substantive identities --

in cases in favor of doctrinal lines. In reality, as one author noted in the
aftermath of Turner, "prison is prison," 22 whether one is prison
because of civil contempt or because of criminal contempt. 23
II.

PRAGMATIC OBJECTIONS TO CIVIL GIDEON 24

In the previous Part, we considered the problem of drawing a line
between the civil and the criminal. There were several, commonly
proffered explanations of why criminal trials might be more serious in
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981).
TuTner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011).
22 Brooke D. Coleman, Prison is Prison, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013).
23 One might say that the person facing civil contempt "holds the jailor's
keys," as the Turner Court says: it is up to him whether he stays in jail or not. But
Lassiter does not make this distinction, i.e., it does not distinguish whether or not the
liberty deprivation is able to be ended by your action or only by the state's. Turner,
131 S. Ct. at 2516-517; Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25. Moreover, as Argersinger makes
clear, the point is whether one is deprived of one's libertyfor any amount of time,
which Turner most certainly was. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
24 Our indebtedness to the work of Benjamin Barton and Stephanos Bibas in
this section should be clear. See Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging
Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967
(2011); Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (andfor Pro Se Court Reform),
62 FLA. L. REV. 1227 (2010).
20

21
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general than civil trials; none of them worked. Or, more particularly, it
couldn't be shown that uniformly criminal trials were more complex,
or had more grave consequences, or were more adversarial than civil
trials. It depended on any given case, whether criminal trials were
more something than civil trials, or whether it was the other way
around. The result was a sort of empty formalism about the criminalcivil divide - the criminal law was different simply because, well, it
was criminal, and the criminal is (by definition? by stipulation?)
different than the civil. This won't do, not as a conceptual matter, and
possibly not as a legal mater either (although we consider this question
more in the third Part).
The collapse of the conceptual case for the criminal-civil divide is
not necessarily good news for those who defend civil Gideon. To be
sure, it can be one step in the case for civil Gideon: there is no nonarbitrary reason to prefer having a right to attorney in a civil context,
as opposed to a criminal context. But, it does not follow from the
collapse of the criminal-civil distinction that the answer is to provide a
right of attorney to all indigent litigants. It can just as easily follow
that neither set of litigants should have the right to attorney. Indeed, it
may be that the most natural-seeming upshot of the removal of a
formal criminal-civil distinction is instead to take things case-by-case,
so that no one by right should get an attorney.
Why would going this way be not simply a matter of logic, but
possibly a good idea? The strongest objection to the idea of civil
Gideon is not a logical one, but a more pragmatic one: it would be too
costly, and too administratively burdensome to require attorneys in
civil cases as well as criminal ones. Even if attorneys may be a good
idea, and even a necessary measure in some cases for litigants to get a
fair trial, extending Gideon to certain civil cases might be simply too
much to ask of cash-strapped states. In making this argument,
opponents of civil Gideon point to the failure of criminal Gideon.
Criminal Gideon has been in many respects a disaster, however
idealistic proponents had originally hoped for it to be. Many times
lawyers are not available, or the lawyers that are available are
incompetent, overloaded, or both.
In the recent spate of articles celebrating the 50th anniversary of
Gideon, many pro-Gideon supporters were the first to proclaim that
the dream of Gideon is far from being realized.2 5 They list case after
case where state-funded and state-supplied criminal defense attorneys
25

See supra note 5.
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have been wildly incompetent. Such articles usually end with stem
admonitions that we need to renew our commitment to Gideon, and
put political will behind our dreams of equal justice before law. The
articles are well meaning, but they provide additional (albeit
unwitting) support to the arguments of those who urge caution before
extending Gideon to civil cases. If there are problems fully funding
Gideon in the status quo, why think that those obstacles will be any
less difficult to overcome when getting funding for civil Gideon? The
problem here is a serious one, and deserves serious consideration:
either explanations of how the funding gap is not as deep as we think it
is, or proposals that manage to bridge the funding gap. We cannot
answer simply by asserting that we need to try harder.
The present fiscal and practical reality is one that all those who are
sympathetic to the civil Gideon movement must confront.
Unfortunately, it is not one that even those who support criminal
Gideon have adequately confronted. It may be rhetorically powerful
and moving to rail against bad lawyers, and there is certainly no
shortage of bad lawyers to rail against. But good lawyers cost money,
and money does not grow on trees, and the right to counsel is
meaningless if it just stands as another unfunded mandate to the states.
We may suspect that those who cite funding limitations when it
comes to civil Gideon secretly oppose that right or at least want to
limit it. 2 6 But this fact does not cause the problem to disappear. Even if
we think that there is no meaningful conceptual line to be drawn
between the civil and the criminal, it could still be the case that civil
Gideon is a bad idea in part because - like criminal Gideon - the

politics and the funding for such a right aren't best thought of or best
realized in rights terms. It is almost as if we were setting ourselves up
for disappointment with criminal Gideon, and so we should be wary of
setting up ourselves for yet another disappointment with civil Gideon.
Gideon was part of a growing movement in the 1960s and 1970s to
expand rights protection beyond mere formal guarantees and into
substantive entitlements.2 7 Harper was a case out of this era,2 8 but

As may be the case with Barton & Bibas, supra note 24.
See Frank 1. Michelman, Foreword: On Protectingthe Poor Through the
FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARVARD L. REv. 7 (1969).
28 Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
668-69 (1966) (lines
drawn on the basis of wealth "disfavored"); see also Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer
Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: the People and the Poll Tax, 103 Nw.
U. L. REv. 63 (2009).
26
27
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Rodriguez represented its dead end. 2 9 The ultimate goal (the dreamedfor ideal) was to make economic inequalities not matter to legal rights,
so that the poor person would get adequate representation and not just
the rich person. Now, it is safe to say that this movement is dead. The
failure to fully implement Gideon is just further proof, if we needed
any, of this fact.
III.

A "MODEST" PROPOSAL

Before there was Gideon, there was Betts, which offered a more
flexible understanding of the right to counsel.3 0 It didn't say that there
was an absolute right in criminal cases for indigent defendants, ;
instead it said that there was a sliding scale due process right to
representation. In its words, the rule of due process:
formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than
those envisaged in other specific and particular
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a
matter of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an
appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That
which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of
fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of
justice, may, in other circumstances and in the light of
other considerations, fall short of such denial. In the
application of such a concept, there is always the
danger of falling into the habit of formulating the
guarantee into a set of hard and fast rules the
application of which, in a given case, may be to ignore
the qualifying factors therein disclosed. 3 1
In short, Betts in no uncertain terms announced that it was an antiformalist case, one that would not be putting a rigid cast on the right of
counsel in all criminal cases. Instead, it would look to the totality of
the facts in each case and then decide whether counsel was necessary.
Betts wanted a rule - a rule that counsel should be appointed in all
29 San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (inequality in
school funding not constitutional violation).
30 We also believe that Betts may have the better argument as to original
constitutional meaning. But this is not the focus of our argument. Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942) (overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
3 Id. at 462.
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criminal cases "whatever the circumstances" 32 - but the Court was not
willing to give it to him.3 3
Betts in many ways represents the status quo with civil Gideon. It
is a case that has obvious echoes in the Court's later decisions in
Lassiter and Turner: flexible and pragmatic, against "hard and fast
rules." The proponents want a rule for counsel in civil cases, and the
Court repeatedly refuses to give it.
There are further similarities between Betts and the civil Gideon
movement. The problem with a one-size-fits-all approach to the right
to counsel, the Betts opinion went on, quoting Judge Bond from the
court below, would be that "Charges of small crimes tried before
justices of the peace and capital charges tried in the higher courts
would equally require the appointment of counsel. Presumably it
would be argued that trials in the Traffic Court would require it." 34
Bond apparently took this to be a reductio of the right to counsel. The
Supreme Court took it further: reading the due process clause this way,
would, as a matter of logic, requirethe appointment of civil counsel in
cases involving property, because the due process clause covered life,
liberty, and property.
By contrast, civil Gideon proponents view this conclusion as the
natural and proper upshot of understanding the right to counsel more
generally. We should not make an artificial divide between the minor
and major crimes, or (at the limit) between criminal cases with serious
consequences and civil cases with serious consequences. What the
Betts court saw as an argument against the right to criminal counsel,
civil Gideon advocates see as an argument in favor of civil counsel.
The Court, of course, didn't take the anti-formalist road for long,
overruling Betts in Gideon. In a moment, we're going to imagine what
the world would be like - the civil law world and the criminal law
world - if Betts were the last word on the right to counsel rather than
Gideon. But it is worth pausing for a moment to look closer at Justice
Harlan's concurrence in Gideon, in which he said that although he
believed Betts should be overruled, it was "entitled to a more
respectful burial than has been accorded."3 5 Harlan's diagnosis of why
Betts should no longer stay good law was not because counsel was not
Id. at 471-72.
An attempt to resist the sort of Gideon formalism was also made in the
concurring opinion to Argersinger. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 2016-017
(1972) (Powell, J. concurring).
34 Id. at 473.
3 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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being appointed when it should have been, but that it was being
appointed nearly all the time.
Betts said that counsel could be appointed in "special
circumstances," but over the years, more and more criminal cases were
found to have special circumstances, almost to the point where "the
mere existence of a serious criminal charge constituted in itself special
circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial." 3 6 In short, the
problem was not that there was no counsel when there needed to be,
but that (in Harlan's opinion), there was nearly always counsel. The
rule that counsel should only be there in "special circumstances"
risked being more honored in the breach than in the observance. This
might relieve some of the worry that a case-by-case process would be
a disaster: courts (including the Supreme Court) seemed to be able to
recognize the seriousness of most criminal cases, taken one at a time,
to the extent that there was at least a presumption in favor of counsel
in most criminal cases.37
But what would a world without the Gideon decision have
looked like? What if Betts were left to stand as the last word on
criminal counsel?
A. Civil Law

The most important thing that could have happened by working in
the register of Betts is that the hold of a strict criminal-civil divide
might have been lessened. The focus of subsequent litigation might not
have been "in what respects is this like a criminal trial?" but more
"what does fundamental fairness require?"38 By starting and ending

with criminal Gideon, the Court was set on a path where the criminal
was exalted as the paradigm, and other cases gained (or lost)
protections by being more or less like a criminal trial. Thus was a type
of formalism born. The substance of the claims wasn't looked at;
instead, it was the category that mattered most.
"Fundamental fairness," the due process guarantee, does not admit
of such easy categorization. Fairness is something that should apply
36

Id. at 351.

In short, it remains possible that there are generalizations which mostly
apply to the criminal and civil case (so that judges will tend to presume counsel is
more necessary in one type of case rather than another). This is compatible with
there being no firm conceptual difference between the two types of cases; indeed,
this seems to have been the status quo prior to Gideon.
3 See the excellent article by Tracey L. Meares, What's Wrong with Gideon,
70 U. CHI. L. REv. 215 (2003) for a fuller discussion of this point.
3
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throughout the law, not more in one area rather than others. This
seems to us not only a possibly better approach but also a more
fundamentally honest approach. As the criminal law comes to
approach less a due process model, and more a crime control model, 39
with bargains and not trials being the norm,4 0 we should not get hung
up on formal divisions. We should look for a fair legal system as a
whole, not in parts. 41
This is not to say that there won't be areas of the law where a right
to counsel will be presumed, but these will not follow any strict
doctrinal lines. Rather, they will focus on when the combination of
complexity, consequentialness, and adversariness rise to a level where
a lawyer is not simply necessary, but required. The list is obvious, and
familiar: immigration proceedings, termination of parental rights,
evictions, etc. These would be looked at on the same level as criminal
proceedings, not necessarily because there is a right to counsel in these
cases, but because counsel is what fundamental fairness requires in

many of these cases.
But we have to be careful not to fall into the trap of Gideon in
making these generalizations: the trap of looking for a rule. We should
not try to rank these areas, as if one area might be (as a general matter)
more serious than others; nor will it be the case that each of the cases
in these areas will rise to the level of needing an attorney. The risk in
taking Gideon as the paradigm rather than Betts is that we fall into
precisely these traps. By using criminal law as the model, by putting
some civil areas above others, and by saying that all cases in one area
or another should have the right to assistance from counsel, we are
relying on formalisms that simply are not true.
B. CriminalLaw

What would happen to criminal law if Gideon had never been
decided? We might think it would be a worse world, but we don't
know this for a fact, and we should concede that the world we have
now in criminal law is far from ideal. The promise of Gideon has at
3 Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess, 113 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1 (1964) (distinguishing the "due process" model from the "crime control"
model).
40 See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (2011).
41 Cf W. Daniel Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of CriminalProcedure:In

re Winship, Stigma, and the Criminal-CivilDivision, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117 (2010)
(proposing a "unified due process approach").
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best gone unfulfilled; at worst, it has been betrayed. Do we know
enough to say that a world without Gideon would certainly be worse?
Consider: the world we have with Gideon is one where many times
counsel is horribly ineffective, where clients lose in spite of having an
attorney, and where the fact of having any attorney at all essentially
acts as a shield against claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We
should also remind ourselves that even without Gideon many states
would still have the right to an attorney, under their own constitutions.
In fact, this was fast becoming the case even when Betts was
decided, 42 and Gideon in many ways just put the Supreme Court's
imprimatur on what looked to becoming a reality anyway.43
What Gideon might have stopped, or slowed down, was a process
of experimentation, on two levels. The first is that different states
might have given different interpretations about what "fundamental
fairness" for an indigent defendant (again using the language of Betts)
required in criminal cases. Maybe it does not always require courtappointed counsel; maybe it requires deference to pro se defendants,
or better procedure. Under Gideon, both criminal and civil reform
advocates have tended to cast the main problem for indigent
defendants as a lack of adequate representationfor which the solution

is more and better representation.44 When you have a hammer, most
things look like nails.
This leads to a second and related point. William Stuntz has
brilliantly made the case in articles and in his book that a focus on
procedure in criminal law can sometimes be counterproductive,
because sometimes procedural improvements are made moot by
changes in substance: more defendants' rights lead to more crimes that
defendants can be charged with.4 5 One way to improve the prospects
of defendants is to work to not make them defendants in the first place:
to take a holistic approach to criminal law, not just a narrowly

Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 477 (1942) (appendix collecting state
statutes, which require that indigent defendants in non-capital as well as capital
criminal cases be provided with counsel on request.)
43 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); see also William J.
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Stuntz, The Political Constitutionof CriminalJustice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 802 (2006)

("Appointing counsel for indigent felony defendants was the policy of all but five
states before the Supreme Court ordered it in Gideon v. Wainwright.").
See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1049 (2013).
45 Stuntz, supra note 40.
44
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procedural one. 4 6 Of course, pursuing stronger rights for defendants is
not incompatible with pushing for decriminalization. But there is
always a question of priorities, where we want to put our money and
our time, where we want to exert our political will. 47 We have been
worried about making sure indigent defendants get adequate attorneys
and that their representation is "fair," 48 while turning our focus away
from the laws that make them defendants in the first place.4 9
CONCLUSION

Of course, Gideon is not going away, even (when combined with
Strickland) if it is now a shell of what it once promised to be. So we
will continue to struggle with the ideal of competent representation
when needed, and the reality of inadequately-funded representation.
But we do not have to be imprisoned by Gideon's concepts. This is
what the civil Gideon movement gets right: there is a certain level of
arbitrariness in mandating representation for all criminal cases (where
imprisonment is at issue) and not mandating representation for any
civil cases. Betts got this right, too. Where the Betts majority and
advocates of civil Gideon part ways is in what lesson to draw from the
arbitrariness of the criminal-civil divide: Betts saw mandatory civil
representation as the reductio ad absurdum of mandatory criminal
representation, while defenders of civil Gideon see mandatory criminal
representation as the starting point.
We can't go back to Betts, nor should we. A reversal or repudiation
of Gideon would be at the very least a symbolic disaster, and would
mean giving up on too much we have gained (however inadequate that
may be). To this extent, our proposal remains a thought experiment
and not something to be actually carried out. Giving up on Gideon
now, with nothing firmly in its place, would be like welfare reform in
the 1990s, which involved a lot of cuts to welfare, but without any real

Natapoff, supra note 44, at 39 ("Other actors and institutions need to bear
greater responsibility for preserving the rights and dignity of defendants and for
maintaining the structural fairness of the process as a whole.").
47 Cf Caplan, supra note 5.
48 We haven't even been good about doing this. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984) (high standards for ineffective assistance of counsel).
49 Natapoff, supra note 44.
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reform.o So let us be completely clear: getting rid of Gideon with
nothing to replace it would be wrong.
At the same time, we should realize that Gideon, even if we had
full funding for it, would not be enough, and would not solve our
problems. What is more, this paper has suggested that criminal
Gideon, and its terms, may be a barrier to civil Gideon. For the very
conceptual structure of Gideon works against the civil Gideon
movement by holding up criminal cases as the paradigm for
seriousness, complexity, and adversariness. To see if a civil case gets
an attorney, we ask: how much is this civil case like a criminal case?
Is it as serious as a criminal case? Is it as complex? Is it as adversarial?
By doing so, Gideon can lead us to ask the wrong type of questions. It
moves us to look for things that may make a criminal case different,
but there is nothing that necessarily makes a criminal case more
deserving of a right to counsel than civil cases. 5 ' The better question is
to ask, what does fundamental fairness require in a case, no matter
whether the case is criminal or civil?
Paradoxically, the best way for the civil Gideon to proceed might
be in first rethinking its relation to Gideon.
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See Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done, ATLANTIC

MONTHLY (March 1997) available at http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/
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51 See supra Part 1.
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